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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE
MURDER.
In

addressing

appeal, this court must

the

sufficiency

of

review the evidence

favorable to the jury's verdict.

the

evidence

on

in a light most

Furthermore, reasonable minds

must be free from a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the offense.

State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Ut. 1983).

In State

v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Ut., 1983), this court elaborated on the
standard of review, stating:
. notwithstanding the presumptions in
favor of the jury's decision this Court still
has the right to review the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the verdict.
The
fabric of evidence against the defendant must
cover the gap between the presumption of
innocence and the proof of guilt.
In
fulfillment of its duty to review the
evidence
and all
inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court
will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as
it will go. But this does not mean that the

court can take a speculative leap across a
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits,
must be sufficient to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
659 P.2d at 444-445.

When the case against an appellant is based

entirely on circumstantial evidence, a reviewing court may find
that

evidence to be sufficient so long as it excludes every

reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence, State v. Watts,
supra:

State v. Romero, 534 P.2d 216 (Ut. 1976).
Appellee argues that this standard was not followed in

Watts.

However,

circumstantial

in Watts this court did

evidence

and

found

support the defendant's theories.

that

the

review all of the
evidence did not

Appellee also argues that the

court's analysis in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Ut. 1985),
does not employ this reasonable alternative hypothesis discussion
even though Bailey involved fingerprint evidence.
the defendant was convicted of a burglary.

In that case

His fingerprints were

found on a padlock and a cut out portion of a metal door that was
the burglar's point of entry into a warehouse.

However, the

fingerprints were not the only evidence admitted
defendant.
burglary

His
in

accomplice

detail.

The

had

testified

court

found

and

that

against the

described
the

the

accomplice

testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction.

The

critical point is that Bailey did not involve only circumstantial
evidence,

consequently,

the

reasonable

analysis was not appropriate.
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alternative

hypothesis

When a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence
is reviewed it is necessary for the appellate court to determine
if the evidence excludes all reasonable inferences of innocence.
In this case, the strongest evidence tending to tie appellant to
the crime scene
introduced

at

is the fingerprint
trial

evidence.

included:

Evidence

Other evidence
of

hair

sample

identification that placed the victim in the appellant's truck.
That evidence corroborated the testimony of an eyewitness who
observed

the victim

(Tr. 891-906)

and appellant

together

in Parowan, Utah.

A splitting maul found at the crime scene was

consistent with one appellant had previously owned.
Appellant

and Robert

(Tr. 837)

Bott both requested that Rita Weatherby

provide them with an alibi for the date the victim disappeared.
(Tr.

478-479)

Beer

cans

found

at

the

homicide

scene had

appellant's fingerprints on them and were likely to have been
purchased at the store where appellant was observed with Sharon
Sant.
None of this evidence indicates that it was appellant
who caused the death of Sharon Sant.

The only evidence tending

to connect appellant with the injury to or death of Sharon Sant
was the bottle with appellant's

fingerprint

in blood.

With

respect to that piece of evidence, the bottle itself had been
manufactured five years before the homicide.

(Tr. 861)

It was

an object that was readily moveable and was found in an area that
was accessible to the public.

The blood type found on the bottle

was consistent with that of both Sant and appellant.
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(Tr. 989)

Appellant
print.

had a large scar on the same finger that

(Tr. 679-680)

left the

The critical aspect about that bottle was

that there was no other circumstantial evidence to indicate that
the blood was fresh at the time the bottle was deposited into the
bush where it was ultimately located.

There was no blood in that

bush, nor was there dirt stuck to the blood on the bottle.
214, 223, 294, 244)

(Tr.

Deputy Masner testified that the print could

have been left any time between the date of manufacture and the
date the bottle was found.
supports

the

inferences

(Tr. 674)
that

the

Consequently, the evidence
blood

on

the

bottle

was

appellant's and that the blood and fingerprint were left on the
bottle prior to the homicide.
The

State's

theory

of

the

case

at

trial was that

appellant had aided in the homicide in violation of Utah Code
Annotated §76-2-202 (1953 as amended).

However, the defendant's

mere presence at the scene of the commission of the offense or
prior

knowledge

that

the

offense

was

to

be

committed

insufficient evidence on which to base a conviction.
Gee, 28 Ut.2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972);
P.2d

1161

(Ut. 1981).

is

State v.

State v. Kerekes, 622

In this case, the farthest

that the

evidentiary fabric can be stretched is that the State proved that
appellant was present at the scene of the homicide.
prove

that

homicide

appellant

requires

a

participated

in

speculative

leap

the

However, to

commission

that

the

inferences from all of the evidence fails support.

of

the

reasonable
Appellant's

judgment and conviction should be reversed and the case remanded
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to the district

court with an order to enter a judgment of

acquittal.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE EFFECT
OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE.
Appellee contends that the trial court did not commit
error by refusing to give appellant's requested instruction on
fingerprint evidence.

In its response brief, appellee argued

that the instruction, as requested, was a comment on the evidence
and

the

instruction

did not

accurately state

the law as it

relates to fingerprint evidence.
In State v. Sanders, 27 Ut.2d 354, 496 P.2d 220 (1972),
this court stated that it was improper for the trial judge to
comment ". . . o n the quality or credibility of the evidence in
such a way as to indicate that he favors the claims or position
of

either

party."

Ld.

at

275.

If an

instruction

unduly

emphasizes portions of the testimony it may be a comment on the
evidence,

State

v.

Lovato,

702

P.2d

instruction is not a comment on the

101

(Ut.

1985).

An

evidence if it is stated in

the abstract and does not tell the jury what the evidence is or
what the facts are, State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Ut. 1976).
Likewise, an instruction that does not advise the jury on the
weight to be given a particular item of evidence is not a comment
on the
See:

evidence, State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Ut. 1985).
Brief of Appellee, pp. 22-36.
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The questionable portion of the requested instruction
in this case stated, "However, if the circumstances are such that
the print could have been impressed at a time other than that of
the incident for which the defendant is charged, then you are not
to

consider

the

defendant's guilt."

fingerprint

evidence

with

respect

to

the

This proposed instruction merely informs the

jury of the legal standard for the use of fingerprint evidence.
See: Chandler v. State, 23 Md.App. 645, 329 A.2d 430 (1974),
People v. Donahue, 50 Ill.App.3d 392, 365 N.E.2d 710 (1977).

In

State v. Bradley, 309 S.E.2d 510 (N.C.App. 1983), the court held
that it was error to refuse to give a requested instruction on
fingerprint evidence.

The instruction requested

indicated that the fingerprint

in that case

evidence was without probative

force unless the circumstances showed that it could have been
impressed at the time the crime was committed.
of a comment

on the evidence

That was no more

than what was involved

in the

instruction at issue here.
Even if a portion of the instruction did constitute a
comment on the evidence, the trial court should not have refused
to give the instruction in substance.

This court has held that

there is no error if the trial court changes the wording of a
requested

instruction or gives that

instruction

in substance.

State v. Rivenburqh, 11 Ut.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689, cert, den. 368
U.S. 922 (1960);

State v. Rosenberg, 35 P.2d 1004 (Ut. 1934).

The logical extension of this practice is to require trial courts
to correct improperly worded instructions that correctly address

-6-

a material issues, Bernhardt v. State, 719 P.2d 832 (Ok.Crim.
1980).

In Colorado trial courts have a positive duty to

cooperate with counsel and correct the tendered instruction or to
incorporate the substance of the requested instruction into one
that is drafted by the court.
(Colo.App. 1985);
(1973);

People v. Weiss, 717 P.2d 511

People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155

People v. Bookman, 646 P.2d 924

(Colo. 1982).

The

requested instruction in this case did raise a material issue.
At a minimum, the trial court had an affirmative duty to strike
or modify language of the submitted instruction so that the jury
may be properly instructed on the law.
Appellee urges this court to adopt the position of the
Indiana Supreme Court with respect to fingerprint evidence that
was upheld in State v. Bruce, 375 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1978).3

In

that case the jury was instructed on the effect of fingerprint
evidence.

The instruction stated that the evidence must show

either that a fingerprint was impressed at or about the time of
the

homicide,

fingerprint
offense.

was
The

or

that

left

at

the
the

instruction

circumstances
time of
went

on

indicate

that

the commission
to

state

that

the

of the
if

the

prosecution failed to prove both of these facts, the jury was to
2
The failure to modify a requested instruction that
in~form is also analogous to the "plain error" rule
an appellate court to reverse a conviction on the
erroneous jury instruction for which there was no
request. State v. Cobo. 60 P.2d 952 (Ut. 1936).
3
Brief of Appellee at p. 34.
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is incorrect
which allows
basis of an
objection or

determine what weight to give the fingerprint evidence and the
jury would be justified in not giving the evidence any probative
value.
In Bruce, the defendant had also requested that the
jury

be

instructed

that

the prosecution

had

to explain

all

fingerprints belonging to other people that were found in a place
that was inaccessible to the general public.

The last portion of

the requested instruction indicated that if the State failed to
meet all of the requested criteria, the jury could disregard the
fingerprint evidence.
went

too far.

fingerprints

The court found that this last portion

By requiring

and

then

the State to explain

instructing

the jury

the other

to disregard

the

evidence if the State failed to make that explanation, denied the
fingerprint evidence its legitimate weight.
However,

the

court

held

that

an

instruction

on

fingerprint evidence is required to be given when it is requested
and is justified by the evidence.
for

may

find

themselves overwhelmed by this type of forensic evidence.

The

court

requiring

in

such

Bruce

an

The reason that the court gave

instruction

approved

the

is

that

substance

jurors

of

instruction that was given by the trial court.

the

requested

The court also

indicated that it would be proper for the jury to be instructed
that fingerprints serve only to link the owner of the prints to
the surface on which they were located.

Further, the court noted

that the jury could also be instructed that the weight to be
given

fingerprint

evidence

depends

surrounding their impression.
-8-

on

the

circumstances

Appellee's request that this court adopt the position
of the Indiana court in Bruce is a concession that the trial
court should have instructed the jury on fingerprint evidence.
The critical portions of appellant's requested instruction and
the

instruction

given

in

Bruce

are

identical

(that

the

fingerprints had to have been left at the time the crime was
committed).

By adopting the Bruce position, appellee apparently

is conceding that the trial court committed error in its failure
to give an appropriate instruction on fingerprint identification.
If there was error in failing to instruct the jury on
fingerprint evidence, the next issue to address is the prejudice
that arises from that error.

As was previously discussed, the

strongest evidence of appellant's involvement in the commission
of the homicide was the fingerprint in blood on the bottle found
at

the scene

of the homicide.

The evidence

indicated that

appellant had a scar on the same finger that left the print.
(Tr. 679-680)
appellant's.

The blood type on the bottle was the same as
(Tr. 989)

There was no blood found in the interior

of the bush where the bottle was

located.

(Tr. 244)

The

fingerprint expert could not give an opinion on the date that the
print had been left on the bottle.

(Tr. 674)

These factors

coupled with the overwhelming nature of fingerprint evidence make
it critical
given.

that

an

instruction on fingerprint

Consequently, the error in failing

instruction was prejudicial.

evidence be

to give such an

Appellant's conviction should be

reversed and a new trial ordered.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR.
The trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence
that appellant had struck his live-in girlfriend, Rita Weatherby,
prior to the homicide.

Appellee argued that this evidence was

introduced to explain why Weatherby gave inconsistent stories to
investigating officers prior to telling them that appellant had
4
requested an alibi for the date that Sharon Sant disappeared.
Those prior inconsistent statements were elicited from Weatherby
during the State's direct examination of her.
There was no objection to the testimony that appellant
had requested that Weatherby provide him with an alibi.

The

trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to elicit
inconsistent statements from the witness for the sole purpose of
showing that Weatherby was afraid of appellant because of this
5
assaultive behavior.
This case is distinguishable from State
v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Ut. 1989), which was cited by appellee.
In Bates, the evidence indicated that a sexual abuse victim had
delayed in reporting that crime.
of

the

mother

defendant's
was

assaultive

admissible

This court held that evidence
behavior

to explain

the

toward
lapse

of

that

victim's

the

time in

4
See:

Brief of Appellee at p. 37.

5
Prior to the witness testifying a hearing was held on the
admissibility of this testimony out of the jury's presence (Tr.
442-447).
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reporting the crime.

The evidence showed why the victim of the

sexual assault was afraid of the defendant.
Appellee cites State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Ut.
1988) f and quotes the balancing test that is to be employed to
determine the admissibility of bad acts evidence.

Before such

evidence is admissible a number of factors must be considered.
The balancing

test employed

in Shickles was adopted

from E.

Clearyf McCormick on Evidence, §190 at 565 (3rd ed. 1984).

That

text provides:
The problem is not merely one of
pigeonholing, but of classifying and then
balancing. In deciding whether the danger of
unfair prejudice and the like substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a
variety of matters must be considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to
the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
760 P.2d at 295-296.
When applied to the facts of this case, the balancing
test

in Shickles

admitted.

requires that the bad acts evidence not be

The only evidence of the commission of the prior

assault was the testimony of Weatherby.

There was no physical

evidence nor were there other witnesses to the events.

The acts

of'violence against Weatherby were somewhat similar to some of

See brief of appellee at 38.
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the evidence from the scene of the homicide.

With respect to

the time interval between the assault and the homicide, Weatherby
did not specify when she was struck by appellant; however, it
would have been within the two months preceding the homicide.

As

for the need for the evidence, there was no objection Weatherby1s
testimony

regarding

the

request

for

the

alibi.

The prior

statements by the witness did not contribute to the state's case.
Consequently, there was no need to introduce those statements as
part of the direct examination of the witness.

The purpose in

introducing this evidence of the witness1 inconsistent statements
and

appellant's

bad

acts

physically abused women.

was

to

prove

that

the

defendant

The victim of the homicide was a woman.

The cumulative effect of the evidence would be to "rouse the jury
to overmastering hostility."
is

that

danger

of

unfair

The conclusion that must be reached
prejudice

from

this

evidence

substantially outweighed its probative value.
There

was

substantial

prejudice

introduction of this bad act evidence.

involved

in

the

Allowing this evidence to

be introduced at trial was an abuse of discretion.

Furthermore,

the nature of the evidence raises a reasonable likelihood that
7
The medical examiner testified that the blood and hair found in
the roadside gravel at the crime scene indicated that Sharon Sant
had suffered a blow to the head.
Q

Had the defense chosen to impeach Weatherby with the prior
statements, then the testimony about appellant's assaultive
behavior would be admissible. This is a tactical decision that
counsel should make in light of the need to impeach a witness and
the potential explanation of the inconsistent statements.
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there was an

improper

Shickles, supra.

basis

for the

jury verdict, State v.

Consequently, there is a reasonable likelihood

that if the evidence had not been introduced, the jury would have
reached a different verdict, State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879
(Ut. 1988).

The judgment and conviction should be reversed and

the case remanded to the district court for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The evidence was insufficient to establish the offense
of second degree murder.

This court should order that a judgment

of acquittal be entered.

In the alternative, a new trial should

be ordered because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on
the nature of fingerprint evidence and because the trial court
allowed

the State to introduce evidence of appellant's prior

assaultive behavior.
instructed

on

In that trial the jury should be properly

fingerprint

evidence,

and

the

State should be

precluded from using the "bad act" evidence.
DATED this

day of December, 1990.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant
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Building,
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84114,

this

day of

ADDENDUM

INSTRUCTION NO.

Q

The state has offered circumstantial evidence in the
nature

of

fingerprint

in this

case.

You are

instructed to

consider this evidence along with all other evidence in making
your determination

of whether the defendant

is guilty or not

guilty of the offense as charged in the information.
before

you

may

find

the

defendant

guilty

on

the

However,
basis of

fingerprint evidence, you must find that the print is in fact the
defendant's

and

that

the print was made at the time of the

incident for which the defendant is charged.

However, if the

circumstances are such that the print could have been impressed
at a time other than that of the incident for which the defendant
is charged, then you are not to consider the fingerprint evidence
with respect

to the defendant's guilt.

The circumstances to

consider in determining whether the print was impressed when the
crime was committed include, but are not limited to, the location
of the print, the character of the place or premises where the
print was found and whether the object would be inaccessible to
the defendant except in the commission of the crime.

In re Marauez. 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977); McLain v. State, 24
So.2d 15 (Miss. 1945); Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595 (D.C.
App. 1967); United States v. Nazarok, 330 F.Supp. 1054 (E.D.
Penn. 1971); Fludinq v. State, 4 Md. App. 664, 244 A.2d 909
(1968); Lawless v. State, 3 Md. App. 652, 241 A.2d 155 (1968).

